The Universal Injunction in U.S. Federal Courts: Origins, Evolution, and Debates
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01 Apr The Universal Injunction in U.S. Federal Courts: Origins, Evolution, and Debates

Posted at 14:25h in Politics by

Introduction

Federal courts are grappling with the controversial remedy of the nationwide (or “universal”) injunction. This type of injunction purports to bar the government from enforcing a law or policy against anyone in the country, not m (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions) (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions) brought the case. In recent years, such injunctions have halted major executive initiatives – from immigration programs to travel bans – provoking intense debate about the proper role of the judiciary. Critics argue that universal injunctions depart from historical equitable practices and exceed the constitutional “case or controversy” limi (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))courts. Supporters contend they are sometimes necessary to afford complete relief and to check unlawful government action on a uniform basis.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the universal injunction. It traces the remedy’s origins in English common law and early American practice, where equity was traditionally confined by in personam limits and relief was typically restricted to the parties. It then examines the development and rise of the universal injunction in the 20th and 21st centuries, highlighting how structural changes (like the expansion of the administrative state and civil-rights litigation) led to broader injunctive orders. Key modern cases – such as United States v. Texas (2015) and **Trum (National Injunctions: What Does the Future Hold? – University of Colorado) (2018) – are discussed to illustrate how nationwide injunctions have been used to freeze federal policies. The paper also analyzes the constitutional and jurisprudential debates surrounding these injunc (National Injunctions: What Does the Future Hold? – University of Colorado)ing concerns about separation of powers, forum shopping, judicial overreach, and the limits of equitable power. It incorporates academic commentary and judicial opinions (for example, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii) that reflect sharply divergent views on the legitimacy of universal injunctions. Finally, the paper contrasts the use of nationwide injunctions under the Biden administration (2021–2024) and the current Trump administration (2025–present), examining how district courts and the Supreme Court have responded to executive policies in each era. Recent rulings, Supreme Court emergency stays, and potential doctrinal shifts are highlighted to show how the landscape may be changing in response to this contentious remedy.

I. Origins in English Equity: In Personam Remedies and Limited Scope

To understand the universal injunction, it is essential to start with its equitable origins in English common law. Historically, the Court of Chancery in England (which handled equitable remedies like injunctions) operated on the principle that an injunction was an in personam order – it bound the defendant personally, directing them to act or refrain from acting. Chancery courts did not purport to make law or bind the world at large; rather, they prov (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) to particular parties in a dispute. As Blackstone observed, by the 18th century equity had developed into a “regular science” of remedies administered by the (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) meant that the scope of relief was generally limited to what was necessary to redress the plaintiff’s injury in that case, against that defendant.

Under traditional equitable rules, all interested parties were usually required to be joined in the suit be (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))uld affect their rights. English courts sometimes permitted representative suits (such as through a “bill of peace” in cases where many parties shared a common interest), but even these bound only a defined group of similarly situated individuals, not the public at large. The “general rule” in equity, as later summarized by Justice Thomas, was that “all persons materially interested” in the subject of the suit should be before the court so that relief would not extend to strangers. In short, nothing in traditional equity resembled a modern nationwide injunction that conclusively prohibits enforcement of a law against all persons. A group of legal historians has noted that “no modern-style nationwide injunctions issued” (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) courts had power to enjoin a defendant as to the plaintiff, but “typically not the world at large”.

This in personam, party-bound nature of equitable relief reflected (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))nd separation-of-powers constraint**. The role of courts was to decide concrete disputes between litigants, not to pronounce general rules for society. English chancery practice influenced the American understanding of judicial power at the Founding. Several Anti-Federalists were wary of extending federal judicial power to equity in Article III, fearing it would give judges a “discretionary power” to shape remedies without legislative guidance【30†L2143-L2 (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) 78*, Alexander Hamilton responded by emphasizing the limited nature of judicial authority – that judges would be “bound down by strict rules and precedents,” and equity would involve discretion only within the confines of resolving the rights of the parties in the case. Thus, from the beginning, American courts inherited the principle that equitable relief should be no broader than necessary to redress the plaintiff’s legal injury.

II. Early U.S. Federal Courts and Article III: Relief Limited to Cases or Controversies

The U.S. Constitution’s Article III confines federal courts to adjudicating “Cases” or “Controversies,” which has long been understood to require an actual dispute between adverse parties and to bar courts from issuing abstract or advisory rulings. Early federal courts took seriously the idea that their judgments and remedies must be tethered to the parties before them. A core aspect (multiple chancellors)e III’s limitation is that a court traditionally grants relief only to the plaintiffs who have established a violation of their rights, and against the defendants who are before the court. The notion of a single litigant obtaining relief on behalf of the general public was generally f (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)rly American jurisprudence.

Supreme Court decisions from the 19th and early 20th centuries reflect this restrained approach. For example, in Scott v. Donald (1897), the Court rejected a request for an injunction that would have protected a broad class of individuals from a South Carolina liquor law (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)e theory that the plaintiff “represents [a] class” whose rights were infringed “too conjectural”. In other words, a single plaintiff could not obtain relief vindicating the rights of others not in the suit. Similarly, the Court strictly policed the requirement that a plaintiff show a personal, concrete injury. In Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) – a case that included Frothingham v. Mellon, a famous early challenge to a federal statute – the Court refused to entertain a taxpayer’s suit seeking to “restrain the enforcement” of a federal law (the Maternity Act) on constitutio (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))he justices held that allowing a single taxpayer to sue to stop a federal statute as a whole would violate Article III limits, as it would effectively make the court an arbiter of policy without a specific injured party: such a suit (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) in equity”* because the plaintiff’s stake is merely that of the public at large. The Court insisted that “the party who assails [a law] must show not only that the statute is invali (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result” of its enforcement. This doctrine meant that early federal courts avoided issuing injunctions that went (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog)as necessary to remedy the plaintiff’s own injury.

In practice, when 19th-century federal courts struck down laws or government actions, the relief granted was usually limited. The court would enjoin the enforcement of the law against the successful plaintiff, but it did not issue orders immunizing all other persons from the law’s reach. A federal injunction was understood to protect the parties in that case. As one scholar observes, throughout the nineteenth century “federal courts would issue injunctions that protected the plaintiff from the enforcement of a federal statute or regulation,” but not injunctions protecting all possible plaintiffs. Courts did not view their role as “striking down” a law in the abstract; rather, they r (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog)spute at hand, often leaving it to other potential litigants to bring their own challenges if similarly aggrieved. The judiciary, in Chief Justice Marshall’s famous formulation, “pronounce[s] the law only in the act of resolving a dispute”. There was no notion that a court’s judgment against a law had the effect of an erga omnes nullification absent class certification or a broader statuto () ()It is important to note that there were procedural mechanisms in early American law for handling lawsuits that implicated many people’s rights – but these were different from modern universal injunctions. One mechanism was the class action’s precursor in equity, the bill of peace, which (as in England) allowed one or a few individuals to sue on behalf of a larger group all having the same claim. Another was the three-judge district court (created by Congress in the early 20th century for certain cases challenging the constitutionality of state or federal statutes), which ensured that particularly consequential injunctions would be heard by a panel of judges and reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. For example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) was decided by a three-judge court (aff’d by the Supreme Court) and resulted in an injunction preventing enforcement of Oregon’s compulsory pu ([PDF] 19A905 Wolf v. Cook County (02-21-20) – Supreme Court)law. That injunction effectively protected not just the plaintiff private schools but all Oregon parents and students from the unconstitutional law. Yet it was issued in a representative capacity (two schools suing “for themselves alone,” but essentially representing all similarly situated schools/parents) and under a special statutory procedure. This highlights that while early courts occasionally issued broad statewide or system-wide injunctions, these were typically in the context of formal class or representative actions, or via special jurisdiction, rather than a single judge issuing a nationwide edict in a run-of-the-mill case.

In summary, the baseline understanding in the early U.S. federal courts was that judicial power is remedial and particularized. An injunction should (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog) (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog)ssary to redress the injury of the parties before the court. The idea of a universal injunction – an order granting relief to persons who are not plaintiffs – would have been seen as incongruent with Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement and with the equitable tradition inherited from English law. This historical backdrop set the stage for the significant shift that would occur ( “Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction” by Samuel L. Bray )20th century.

III. The Rise of the Universal Injunction in the 20th and 21st Centuries

A. No “National” Injunctions Through the Early 20th Century

For the first century and a half of the Republic, no federal court purported to issue what we now call a nationwide (or universal) injunction. In the words of one analysis, “Through the middle of the twentieth century, there do not appear to have been any national injunctions.” Injunctions were generally party-specific. Even when federal courts struck down laws as unconstitutional, the relief was usually confined to declaring the law unenforceable against the plaintiffs. As noted above, exceptions existed in the form of multi-party or class litigation (e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters in 1925, where relief extended to those in a represented group). But those were not unilateral nationwide orders by a single district judge on behalf of unnamed third parties. Mila Sohoni’s research on the “lost history” of the universal injunc (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)ts around a dozen examples of “non-plaintiff-protective injunctions” in the first half of the 20th century, but many of these were issued by three-judge courts or even the Supreme Court itself. One notable example is Pierce (mentioned above). Another example identified by Sohoni is an injunction issued by the Supreme Court in 1913 against enforcement of a law, and a D.C. Circuit injunction in 1939 – both earlier than the 1960s and contradicting the notion that the device had no antecedent before the late 20th century. These instances, however, were rare and (District Court Reform: Nationwide Injunctions – Harvard Law Review) (Multistate lawsuits against the federal government during the Biden …)contexts.

Overall, the conventional wisdom up to mid-century was that a federal court deciding a constitutional case might declare a statute or policy invalid, but the remedy would focus on the plaintiffs. Courts did not see themselves as “striking down” laws for everyone; rather, a law was nullified as to the litigants, and others would likely benefit only indirectly (e.g., via stare decisis in future cases, or by government voluntarily extending relief to others) (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog) the Supreme Court recognized new constitutional rights or invalidated statutes in landmark cases, the actual relief often technically applied only to the parties, even though in practice the government usually conformed broadly to the ruling. For example, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) was a class action on behalf of all affected students in the jurisdictions before the Court, not an order by one judge applying nationwide; similarly, early desegregation and reapportionment cases in the 1960s were either class actions or three-judge court decisions affecting p (Multistate lawsuits against the federal government during the Biden …)ates or districts. The machinery of class actions (formalized in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) in 1966 for civil-rights injunctive relief) became the primary means to achieve broad injunctive relief for multiple people with the same claim.

Some scholars have argued that the rise of structural injunctions and large class actions in the mid-20th century may have paved the way, conceptually, for judges to think in terms of system-wide or nationwide relief. During the civil rights era, federal courts issued sweeping injunctions to desegregate entire school systems or reform state institutions, benefitting many individuals who were not named plaintiffs (though usually within a defined class or geographic area). This “reconceptualization of the role of the courts” in vindicating rights on a broad scale set the s (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog) later acceptance of nationwide injunctions as a tool. In essence, as society came to see the federal courts as guardians of constitutional rights for classes of persons (e.g., schoolchildren, voters, prisoners), the leap to protecting all similarly situated persons vi (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)t became less unthinkable.

B. The First Modern Nationwide Injunctions (1960s–1970s)

By the 1960s, the ingredients were in place for the emergence of the nationwide injunction. The federal government had dramatically expanded its regulatory activitie (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog) (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog)t Society programs), leading to more frequent lawsuits challenging federal statutes and regulations. Often these suits were brought in a few friendly forums (e.g., the District of Columbia for challenges to federal regulations, or certain circuits known for particular leanings). Meanwhile, the newly invigorated practice of public-law litigation and class actions sug (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)broad relief was sometimes appropriate to prevent a multiplicity of suits or to ensure uniform justice. Still, even at this time, the idea of an injunction protecting non-parties was met with hesitation and confusion.

A commonly cited first example of a true nationwide injunction is Wirtz v. Baldor Electric Co. (D.C. Cir. 1963). In that case, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Secretary of Labor from enforcing a new wage regulation, and the injunction was not limited to the particular (SCOTUS to Consider Emergency Applications to Lift Nationwide Injunctions on EO Ending Birthright Citizenship? | Immigration Blog)ut effectively barred enforcement nationwide. Scholars identify Wirtz as the first instance where a federal court explicitly enjoined a federal policy across-the-board (this is the case referenced by Senator Grassley as “no clear record of a universal injunction issued before 1963,” implying Wirtz in 1963 was the first). The Wirtz injunction was unusual enough that it did not immediately spawn a trend; it was more of a harbinger.

Another early milestone came in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Flast was significant not for actually granting a nationwide injunction (the Supreme Court in that case established taxpayer standing under certain circumstances but did not reach final relief), but for the discussion it prompted. The plaintiffs in Flast had initially sought to enjoin a federal education funding program nationwide (somewhat like the plaintiff in Frothingham decades earlier, but now with a standing argument that succeeded). By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs narrowed their request to an injunction against funding in New York City only, and the government pointed this out. The Supreme Court, however, “did not hold them to that concession” and explicitly “contemplated that the injunction might be broader than New York City” programs. While the Court remanded the case without definitively approving a nationwide remedy, the key point is that Flast signaled a shift – the Court no longer found it “unthinkable” to consider an (Multistate lawsuits against the federal government during the Biden …)extending beyond the immediate plaintiffs. By focusing on justiciability (standing) and largely ignoring remedial scope in its analysis, the Flast Court opened the door to broader injunctions once a case was properly in court.

Not long after Flast, a district court issued what is often cited as the first explicit nationwide injunction against federal government action: Harlem Valley Transportation Ass’n v. Stafford, 360 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In that case, environmental groups challenged the Interstate Commerce Commission’s procedures, and during the litigation they sought class certification to represent all who would be harmed nationwide by the ICC’s failure to produce timely environmental impact statements. The judge (Hon. Marvin Frankel) expressed concern whether, absent a certified class, he could issue relief “of nationwide effect” reaching beyond the named plaintiffs’ more local interests. Remarkably, the federal defendants conceded that if the plaintiffs were entitled to relief at all, a nationwide injunction would be appropriate to ensure uniform compliance by the agency. Given this concession, Judge Frankel proceeded to issue a preliminary injunction applying nationwide, and the Second Circuit affirmed without addressing the scope explicitly. As one commentary noted, “the court had backed into a national injunction without any real consideration” – essentially, because the government didn’t object, a major procedural boundary was crossed. The Harlem Valley case illustrated how a combination of circumstances (plaintiffs pushing for broad relief, and defendants not pressing the issue) could result in a de facto universal injunction even in a non-class suit.

By the late 1970s, the concept of a nationwide injunction was at least recognized, though not yet commonplace. Courts and commentators were still grappling with whether a single district judge had authority to issue such sweeping relief. Some appellate decisions in the 1970s expressed discomfort with nationwide or “classwide” relief granted without a formal class. For instance, in some cases involving draft laws and social security regulations, courts questioned whether one plaintiff’s victory could automatically benefit others. Nonetheless, there was an increasing accepta (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))cases, district courts could enjoin federal laws or regulations on a broader-than-plaintiff basis – especially when necessary to give the plaintiff complete relief or to avoid inconsistent obligations for the defendant. This period can be seen as a transitional phase: the nationwide injunction moved from a virtually unknown concept to a plausible, if still extraordinary, tool in the jud ( “Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction” by Samuel L. Bray ) ( “Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction” by Samuel L. Bray ).

C. Explosion of Nationwide Injunctions in the Modern Era (1980s–Present)

From the 1980s onward – and especially in the past two decades – the use of nationwide injunctions by district courts “exploded in popularity”. What was once rare became a familiar feature of high-stakes litigation. Several factors drove this trend. First, the growth of the administrative state and the availability of Administrative Procedure Act (APA) lawsuits (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (often interest groups or coalitions of states) frequently challenged federal regulations and sought broad relief. The APA authorizes courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” agency action, which some courts interpreted as permitting universal r (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (Government gets green light to implement “public charge” rule pending appeals – SCOTUSblog)e nationwide). While “setting aside” an agency rule is slightly different from an injunction, in effect it can operate similarly – preventing the rule’s enforcement against anyone. District courts in D.C. and elsewhere regularly issued nationwide vacaturs of regulations in environmental, immigration, and health policy cases throughout the 1980s–2000s without much controversy.

Second, civil rights and impact litigation strategies evolved to seek quick, comprehensive remedies. Instead of litigating identical issues in multiple jurisdictions (risking conflicting outcomes and delay), plaintiffs would forum (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))sympathetic judge who could issue a single injunction providing nationwide relief. For example, in the early 2010s, advocates challenging aspects of the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate and LGBTQ rights policies sometimes obtained nati (A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions)ctions (or attempted to) from district judges whose ideological leanings were favorable. Likewise, states opposing certain Obama-era environmental regulations coordinated lawsuits to be heard by particular judges with the aim of securing broad injunctive relief.

By the mid-2010s, both political sides were using nationwide injunctions as a legal weapon in highly charged policy disputes. A well-known example was the case of United States v. Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), which involved a coalition of 26 states (led by Texas) suing to block President Obama’s Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) immigration program. In February 2015, Jud (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))Hanen of the Southern District of Texas issued a preliminary injunction nationwide, halting the implementation of DAPA across the entire country. This order “shut down the implementation of the Obama administration’s most important immigration program” at the time. The nationwide scope was justified by the court partly on the need for uniformity in immigration enforcement and the impracticality of limiting relief to the plaintiff states (since the federal program would operate uniformly). The Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction, and an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment (4-4) in 2016, leaving the nationwide injunction in place. United States v. Texas was a watershed – it demonstrated the potent power of a single district judge to derail a major federal policy for the entire nation. After that case, “the national injunction [had] emerged” as a regular (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018)) charged cases.

During the presidency of Donald Trump (2017–2021, often referred to as the “first Trump Administration”), nationwide injunctions be (U.S. Reports: Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).)-page news. Plaintiffs – frequently states with Democratic attorneys-general, as well as public-interest groups – raced to (17-965 Trump v. Hawaii (06/26/2018))es in jurisdictions perceived as friendly (such as the Northern District of California, or Hawaiʻi, or Maryland) to challenge Trump Administration policies ranging from the so-called “travel ban” to environme ( “Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction” by Samuel L. Bray ) ( “Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction” by Samuel L. Bray )ct judges, in a number of instances, granted broad injunctions forbidding enforcement of those policies anywhere in the United States. For example:

The statistics underscore this trend. It is reported that more than two-thirds of all universal injunctions in the past 25 years were issued against the Trump Administration (2017–2021). At least 55 nationwide injunctions were issued during those four years, according to one tally, blocking a wide array of Trump’s initiatives. This wave led to criticism that a single judge (often derided as a “rogue” or “resistance” judge) could hamstring national policy. Yet, it’s notable that the pattern is bipartisan: when a Democrat (Obama) was in office, Republican states sought and obtained nationwide injunctions (as in the DAPA case); when a Republican (Trump) was in office, Democratic states and groups did the same. And the pattern has continued – under President Biden (2021–2024), red states frequently sued and obtained nationwide stays of Biden’s policies (on immigration, COVID-19 mandates, etc.), though somewhat fewer in number. By one count, 14 nationwide injunctions were issued during President Biden’s four-year term, halting measures like vaccine mandates, immigration enforcement priorities, environmental rules, and eviction moratoriums. By contrast, in just the first two months of President Trump’s current term (2025), at least 15 universal injunctions were issued by courts against various Trump executive actions, “surpassing the 14 [injunctions] President Biden faced throughout his four-year term.” This stark statistic (cited by Senator Grassley in March 2025) shows how routine the practice has become in our polarized era: whichever party controls the White House, the opposition states and interest groups will very likely turn to friendly district courts to seek nationwide relief from contentious policies.

Some concrete examples from the Biden years illustrate both the prevalence of nationwide injunctions and the Supreme Court’s growing intervention via the “shadow docket” (emergency stays):

  • Immigration: Early in Biden’s term, Texas and other states sued to block the reversal of Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy (forcing asylum seekers to wait in Mexico). Judge Kacsmaryk (N.D. Tex.) issued a nationwide injunction compelling the Biden Administration to reinstate the program. The Supreme Court initially declined to stay that injunction, forcing the policy back into effect, before eventually deciding (in Biden v. Texas, 2022) that the states lacked a substantive claim to dictate immigration policy, which allowed the injunction to be lifted. Similarly, Texas obtained a nationwide injunction in 2021 blocking new DHS immigration enforcement guidelines (which prioritized certain deportations over others); that was stayed by the Supreme Court in mid-2022 and ultimately vacated on standing grounds in United States v. Texas (2023), essentially freeing the administration from the injunction.
  • COVID-19 Mandates: The Biden Administration’s COVID vaccination mandates faced multiple nationwide injunctions. For instance, a district court in Georgia enjoined the federal contractor vaccine mandate nationwide in late 2021, and a Missouri district court initially blocked a CMS healthcare worker vaccine mandate in 10 states (later expanded by another court). The OSHA large-employer vaccine mandate was stayed nationwide by the Fifth Circuit. The Supreme Court in January 2022 took up these matters on an emergency basis: it stayed the lower court injunctions insofar as they prevented enforcement of the CMS mandate (thus allowing that mandate to proceed nationwide), but it invalidated the OSHA rule (essentially making the Fifth Circuit’s nationwide stay permanent). These actions obviated further dispute over “scope,” but show the dynamic – district courts issuing broad injunctions, followed by rapid Supreme Court review.
  • Other Policies: A federal judge in Louisiana issued a universal injunction in 2022 preventing the Biden Administration from lifting the Title 42 public-health order at the border (affecting immigration across all states). In 2023, a federal judge in Texas (Judge Kacsmaryk) issued a nationwide order suspending FDA approval of the abortion pill mifepristone, which would have removed the drug from the market nationwide; the Fifth Circuit narrowed that order slightly (to only roll back recent FDA rule changes) but still with nationwide effect, and the Supreme Court promptly stayed the order in full pending appeal. Also in 2023, a judge in Louisiana (Judge Doughty) issued a nationwide injunction barring federal officials from pressuring social-media companies about content moderation (a case raising First Amendment issues); the Fifth Circuit later modified that injunction to be somewhat narrower, and the Supreme Court stayed even that modified injunction in late 2023. Each of these examples underscores that nationwide injunctions were a regularly sought remedy against Biden-era policies, and the Supreme Court frequently stepped in – though often without directly opining on whether the nationwide scope was appropriate, instead focusing on the merits or the necessity of interim relief.

As the current Trump Administration (2025–present) began, the judicial resistance via nationwide injunctions has, if anything, intensified. President Trump’s renewed agenda (including controversial executive orders) has been met with immediate lawsuits and sweeping injunctions from judges in blue states. Notably, in January 2025, President Trump signed an executive order attempting to end birthright citizenship for certain children born in the U.S. (those born to unauthorized immigrants or certain temporary visa holders). This unprecedented order was swiftly challenged in multiple jurisdictions. Within weeks, judges in Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington state each issued nationwide injunctions barring enforcement of the order. These injunctions prevented the policy from taking effect anywhere, protecting not only the plaintiffs (a few affected individuals and advocacy groups) but everyone who would have been subject to the policy. The Trump Administration decried this outcome and rushed to the Supreme Court, filing emergency applications in March 2025 that urged the Court to vacate or narrow the injunctions. Specifically, the government argued that the relief should at most apply to the named plaintiffs or, if broader, be limited to the plaintiff organizations or plaintiff states – pointing out that 18 states supporting the policy were being unjustly thwarted by injunctions issued at the behest of other states. The administration’s brief bluntly accused the district courts of overstepping their authority and “disrupt[ing] the judicial process” by preventing issues from percolating in different circuits. As of this writing, the Supreme Court had not yet definitively ruled on these applications, but it signaled interest in the issue. Court watchers speculated that this could be the vehicle for the Supreme Court to finally confront the question of universal injunctions head-on.

Indeed, the combination of repeated use of such injunctions and increasingly stark ideological stakes has set the stage for potential Supreme Court or congressional action. Supreme Court justices across the spectrum have expressed unease with the status quo (for different reasons), and legislation has been proposed to rein in universal injunctions. Before turning to those debates, it is worth summarizing the current landscape: Universal injunctions have become commonplace in litigation over federal policy. They are sought by prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course (“we want nationwide relief”), and many district judges have been willing to grant them in high-impact cases. At the same time, the Supreme Court’s “shadow docket” has frequently been used to stay or modify such injunctions pending appeal, indicating that the high court is actively managing their effects even if it hasn’t issued a definitive opinion on their legality. The scene is one of a remedial tool that has leapt from obscurity to prominence, with far-reaching implications for separation of powers and judicial practice.

IV. Constitutional and Jurisprudential Debates on Universal Injunctions

The rise of nationwide injunctions has ignited intense debates in legal circles. The questions at the heart of this issue are: Do federal courts have the constitutional or equitable authority to issue universal relief? If they do, is it wise or legitimate to exercise that power routinely? This Part examines the arguments on both sides – grounded in Article III, historical equity, separation-of-powers principles, policy concerns like forum shopping, and practical considerations of judicial administration. It also highlights notable commentary by Supreme Court justices and scholars, revealing a divide in how universal injunctions are viewed.

A. Article III and the Limits of “Cases or Controversies”

One of the strongest critiques of universal injunctions is that they conflict with Article III’s limitation of federal courts to actual cases or controversies. Justice Clarence Thomas, in a much-cited concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii (2018), argued that universal injunctions “appear to be inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the power of Article III courts.” He noted that such injunctions did not emerge until about “a century and a half after the founding”, and in his view, they were not contemplated by traditional equitable practice. Article III, as traditionally understood, authorizes courts to resolve the rights of the parties in a case; issuing relief to those who are not parties arguably goes beyond the judicial power. Thomas pointed out that no statute grants courts the power to issue universal injunctions, so the only possible basis would be inherent equitable authority – but he reasoned that general grants of equitable power (like 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1361) are constrained by the “history and traditions” of equity as of 1789. In other words, unless Congress explicitly authorized broader relief (and even then, there might be Article III doubts), courts should stick to plaintiff-specific remedies.

Thomas bolstered his argument with historical examples: Early American courts did not issue injunctions for the benefit of nonparties. A plaintiff could not sue to vindicate a “public right” (a right held in common by the community) without showing a specific injury to himself. This principle was affirmed in cases like Massachusetts v. Mellon (1923) and Frothingham, as discussed earlier – the idea that courts won’t entertain generalized grievances or provide what amounts to policy oversight. Thomas cited Scott v. Donald (1897) to show the Court long ago rejected an injunction theory where a plaintiff asserted the rights of others in similar circumstances. In Thomas’s view, the traditional role of the judiciary is to redress individual harms, not to manage or annul laws wholesale.

Echoing these points, Professor Samuel Bray has been a leading scholarly critic of national injunctions. He contends that “Article III gives the judiciary authority to remedy the wrongs done to those litigants, not the wrongs done to others.” Bray’s historical research concludes that nothing in the equitable practices at the founding, nor in the structure of Article III, permits a single court to issue an order binding the government with respect to nonparties. He emphasizes the shift from the English “single Chancellor” system to our “multiple chancellors” (many federal judges) system: in England, one Chancellor issuing broad decrees could at least maintain consistency, but in the U.S., multiple judges issuing conflicting nationwide orders would create chaos. Bray argues for a bright-line rule that courts should issue “plaintiff-protective” injunctions only – enjoining unlawful action only as to the plaintiff – and leave it to other plaintiffs to seek their own relief or to class actions to aggregate claims properly.

On the other side of the debate, proponents of nationwide injunctions assert that Article III does not compel such a cramped view of remedies once jurisdiction is established. Professor Alan Trammell, for instance, argues that the Article III case-or-controversy requirement is about standing and justiciability (ensuring the plaintiff has a concrete injury), but once a court has jurisdiction and determines that a law is unlawful, “the standing inquiry ends and the proper scope of the remedy begins.” In his view, nothing in Article III requires that relief be limited to the plaintiff; rather, courts have a mandate to provide full relief for the legal violation. If a law is deemed unconstitutional or illegal, then enjoining its enforcement – even as to nonparties – might simply be the logical extent of providing complete relief to the plaintiff. For example, if Plaintiff A shows that a regulation is invalid, issuing an injunction that only stops enforcement against A but allows it to be enforced against everyone else could be seen as partial relief – because the unlawful regulation remains in place in a way that could indirectly harm A (through, say, regulatory context or interactions with others). Trammell thus rejects the idea that judicial power is strictly limited to dispute-resolution between the named parties; he argues that historically courts have on occasion issued judgments that incidentally benefit nonparties (for instance, a judgment invalidating a tax might practically mean the government won’t enforce that tax against others). In sum, this camp believes Article III allows courts, once properly seized of a case, to “bind nonparties” through the force of a judgment or injunction, especially when uniformity is needed for effective relief.

Another scholar, Professor Mila Sohoni, in The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, has taken a nuanced historical position that supports the constitutionality of such injunctions. She documents earlier instances (pre-1960s) where courts did grant broad injunctions and argues that these demonstrate “the power [of courts] includes the power to issue injunctions that protect those who are not plaintiffs.”. Sohoni’s view is that there is “only one ‘judicial power’” under Article III, and it encompasses whatever remedies (including broad injunctions) are necessary to decide a case in equity. The equity jurisdiction, she notes, was understood to be flexible and to afford complete justice; if that meant enjoining a law’s enforcement in toto, then as long as the plaintiff had standing, the court could do so without offending Article III. In essence, supporters of universal injunctions argue that once jurisdiction is proper, the scope of equitable relief is a matter of judicial discretion and prudence, not a hard constitutional line.

B. Traditional Equity vs. Modern Remedies

Closely related to Article III arguments are those grounded in the traditions of equitable relief. Opponents of nationwide injunctions frequently invoke the maxim that equity acts in personam, not in rem. Justice Thomas in Hawaii underscored that broad equitable powers given by statute must be exercised in line with the “system of … remedies” from the English Chancery in 1789. Citing decisions like Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund (1999), he noted the Court’s insistence that new forms of injunction (like the asset-freeze injunction disallowed in Grupo Mexicano) cannot be created out of whole cloth if they were unknown to traditional equity. By analogy, because “nothing remotely like a national injunction” existed historically, courts today should not assume they can issue one absent explicit authorization. Furthermore, equitable principles such as considering the rights of absent parties, tailoring relief narrowly, and not imposing undue burdens weigh against universal decrees. Justice Thomas and others have argued that many equitable doctrines (e.g., those requiring joining indispensable parties, or limiting injunctions to necessary scope) are flouted by nationwide injunctions. There is also an argument that nationwide injunctions resemble prohibited “obey-the-law” injunctions – i.e., they command the government to follow the law generally (with respect to everyone), which traditionally courts avoided in favor of specific relief to specific injuries.

On the other hand, proponents contend that equity has always been about flexibility and doing complete justice. If a court of equity determines a defendant’s action (say, enforcing a certain regulation) is unlawful, it has the power to “restrain the defendant’s conduct” broadly enough to prevent ongoing harm. Professor Douglas Rendleman argues that traditional equity, as a source of judicial power, can “fuel court discretion to order relief beyond the parties”. He points out that since Marbury v. Madison (1803), it has been the role of judges to declare what the law is and enjoin unconstitutional acts. In modern times, where government programs affect millions, limiting an injunction to one plaintiff might be senseless – the illegal act is the policy itself, so equity can enjoin its enforcement wherever it would be enforced. Rendleman acknowledges that national injunctions are a “strong medicine” but sees them as within the traditional equitable arsenal, provided courts exercise prudence and principles like balancing the equities.

Notably, defenders often cite the analogy of desegregation and other structural injunctions: In Brown v. Board, courts issued injunctions that applied to entire school districts (affecting many children and families who were not named in the case). Those were seen as proper exercises of equity to vindicate constitutional rights across a system. By extension, if a federal policy (say a travel ban or a deportation policy) is found unconstitutional (e.g., as a violation of the Establishment Clause or equal protection), a court could just enjoin its application to the plaintiffs, but that would result in piecemeal enforcement – arguably an intolerable outcome for rights that by their nature are broad. Equity, it is argued, allows the court to frame relief that “protect[s] the plaintiff fully,” even if that means others incidentally benefit. Indeed, sometimes only a universal injunction will fully protect the plaintiff. For example, in the Texas DAPA case, Texas argued that if DAPA was unlawful, an injunction only barring DAPA for Texas would not fully solve Texas’s injury (the presence of additional individuals with quasi-legal status), since those people could just move to Texas from other states. This was one rationale Judge Hanen used to justify the nationwide scope – immigration by nature is interstate, so partial relief would be ineffective. Such reasoning appeals to equitable flexibility: the court tailored relief to the problem, which happened to be nationwide in extent.

C. Separation of Powers and the Role of the Courts

Another major dimension of the debate concerns the proper role of the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches. Critics warn that nationwide injunctions invite judicial overreach and disrupt the separation of powers. When a single district judge can effectively nullify a federal law or executive policy across the country, it concentrates tremendous power in the judiciary – arguably more than the framers intended. As Justice Gorsuch observed, these injunctions often force judges (and ultimately the Supreme Court on emergency appeal) into making “rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions” about national policy. Rather than the normal process of multiple cases percolating in different circuits (leading potentially to a circuit split that the Supreme Court can then resolve with full briefing and deliberation), a nationwide injunction can short-circuit this process by imposing a de facto resolution from the outset. This is a separation-of-powers concern in that it diminishes the quality of judicial decision-making (courts deciding issues in an interlocutory posture under time pressure) and can be seen as courts seizing a policy-making role, issuing broad orders that affect how laws function nationally before the appellate process is complete.

Moreover, nationwide injunctions can mire the courts in political controversy, potentially undermining judicial legitimacy. During the Trump administration, the President frequently railed against “so-called judges” who issued nationwide injunctions, accusing them of acting as partisan saboteurs. While the judiciary’s duty is to check the political branches when they overstep the Constitution, doing so via sweeping injunctions that halt an entire program can trigger intense political backlash. Some argue that a more modest judicial approach (ruling on the law but not granting universal relief unless absolutely necessary) might preserve public perception of courts as neutral arbiters rather than political actors.

From the perspective of the executive branch, nationwide injunctions are seen as deeplyFrom the perspective of the executive branch, nationwide injunctions are seen as a serious intrusion into executive authority. They prevent the Executive from enforcing laws or policies even outside the judicial district of the deciding court, effectively allowing “a single district court to … paralyze the enforcement” of federal law. Critics argue this violates the constitutional separation of powers by giving the judiciary a de facto veto over nationwide policy. Senator Chuck Grassley recently charged that district judges have “repeatedly chosen not only to decide the cases before them, but also to issue orders derailing executive policy nationwide,” which he denounced as judicial overreach and “policymaking” by the courts. The Department of Justice under both Democratic and Republican administrations has likewise bristled at universal injunctions. They contend that such injunctions encourage a “clash” between branches, with the judiciary preventing the executive from even experimenting with policies in some jurisdictions to see if they might be lawful or effective. By freezing a policy across the board, courts deny the political branches the usual benefit of trying out laws while different lawsuits proceed independently.

On the flip side, supporters of nationwide injunctions argue that these remedies serve as an important check on executive (and legislative) excesses. When the political branches violate the Constitution or clear statutory commands, a broad injunction may be the only way to prevent ongoing harm. “If the Executive knows a policy is likely illegal, why should it be allowed to enforce it against anyone at all?”, proponents ask. They note that injunctions of large scope can “safeguard constitutional norms” by halting widespread rights violations immediately. Professor Rendleman, for example, points out that a national injunction can function as a crucial check in times when the executive displays a “pattern of flouting constitutional norms and rule of law”. From this perspective, far from aggrandizing the judiciary, universal injunctions constrain an overreaching executive and reinforce separation of powers by ensuring the President and agencies act within legal bounds. This argument carries particular force in cases where delaying relief (to let issues percolate through many suits) would allow irreparable harm to many. Civil-rights advocates often note that without broad injunctive relief, people in some parts of the country might suffer violations longer simply because their cases have not yet reached judgment, leading to unequal protection of the laws.

D. Forum Shopping, Conflicting Rulings, and Judicial Efficacy

A practical concern in this debate is that nationwide injunctions incentivize forum shopping and can lead to conflicting rulings. Because a single victory can deliver total victory (stopping a policy nationwide), plaintiffs have a strong motive to file in the most favorable forum. This has been borne out in practice: Attorneys-general of Democratic-led states filed challenges to Trump policies in courts known for liberal judges (e.g. the Northern District of California or District of Hawai‘i), while Republican state coalitions filed against Obama and Biden policies in Texas or other conservative jurisdictions. The result is what Justice Gorsuch described as a “lottery” where litigants shop for a friendly judge who can “claim a nationwide victory” for their side. This not only undermines the neutrality of the judicial process but can skew policy: the administration effectively has to win every case in every jurisdiction to carry out its program, whereas its opponents need win only once to block the program everywhere.

Conflicting injunctions are another nightmare scenario. If two different district courts issue incompatible nationwide orders – for example, one court enjoins a regulation, while another (perhaps in a case brought by supporters of the policy) orders that the regulation stay in effect – the government is put in an impossible bind. This possibility is not hypothetical. During litigation over the Trump Administration’s decision to rescind DACA (Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals), one district court (in D.C.) ordered the Administration to continue DACA, while another (in Texas) considered an injunction to halt DACA as unlawful. The conflict was managed only because the Texas court delayed action, but it highlighted the untenable situation that could arise. Justice Thomas warned that “these injunctions are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system – preventing legal questions from percolating and encouraging gamesmanship”. The normal development of the law (via multiple circuits reaching considered decisions that can later be harmonized by the Supreme Court) is short-circuited. Instead, issues can be thrust onto the Supreme Court’s emergency docket, with the Justices asked to issue stays or temporary orders without full briefing. Gorsuch noted that by granting quick nationwide relief, lower courts force “rushed, high‑stakes, low‑information” decision-making at the Supreme Court level, which is not a healthy way to decide important legal questions.

In response to these concerns, calls for reform have grown louder. One idea is to require that any injunction extending beyond the plaintiffs be issued only by a three-judge district court (as was historically required for certain nationwide-impact cases), with direct appeal to the Supreme Court. This would reduce inconsistent rulings and curb forum shopping, since plaintiffs couldn’t simply pick a lone judge. Another approach is to make greater use of class actions – if broad relief is needed, the court can certify a plaintiff class (or defendant class) that brings all affected parties before the court, thereby legitimatizing the scope of an injunction. Indeed, some scholars term nationwide injunctions in individual suits “de facto class actions” and argue that formal class procedure is the proper mechanism to achieve the same result with proper representation. Legislation has also been proposed: Senator Grassley’s aforementioned bill (the Judicial Relief Clarification Act of 2025) aims to “restrain [lower courts’] ability to issue universal injunctions,” essentially forbidding district judges from blocking enforcement of a law against non-parties. Under that bill, a plaintiff could still get an injunction protecting their rights, but not a sweeping order for everyone else. Additionally, the bill would make government-favored procedural remedies (like immediate appeal of any temporary restraining order against the government) more accessible. Whether through judicial self-restraint or congressional action, there is a growing sense that some rules of the road are needed to handle this “rogue” remedial device.

E. Divergent Views Among Judges and the Path Ahead

Within the judiciary, views on universal injunctions are not monolithic. Justice Thomas has emerged as the leading voice questioning their legality; his Trump v. Hawaii concurrence urged the Court to address the issue and suggested that absent legislative authorization (and perhaps even then), such injunctions exceed both historical equity and Article III limits. He concluded bluntly that “universal injunctions are legally and historically dubious”, and warned that if lower courts continue the trend, the Supreme Court “is dutybound to adjudicate [the] authority” of courts to issue them. Justice Gorsuch, in a concurrence in the 2020 DHS v. New York stay order, similarly criticized nationwide injunctions and highlighted their lack of pedigree and negative systemic effects. He implied that while the Court was then dealing with the symptom (by granting a stay), it would eventually need to “address the underlying equitable and constitutional questions” directly.

Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett have not written extensively on the subject, but several of them have signaled concern during oral arguments or joined the opinions of Thomas and Gorsuch in stays. The liberal justices (Kagan, Sotomayor, and during her tenure, Ginsburg) tended to be more accepting of broad injunctions, at least when used to stop policies they viewed as unlawful (e.g., travel ban or public charge rule). Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for instance, in a dissent from a stay, suggested that the majority was too eager to lift nationwide injunctions and that such relief can be appropriate to provide complete relief to prevailing parties (she did not defend them in principle so much as object to the Court’s haste in undoing them). The divide is not strictly partisan, however. Some appellate judges across the spectrum have questioned nationwide injunctions. The Seventh Circuit, in the Chicago v. Sessions sanctuary city case, initially upheld the district court’s decision to issue relief but limited it to Chicago (vacating the nationwide portion), with Judge Manion calling the broader scope an “overstep” of judicial authority. (On rehearing en banc, however, the Seventh Circuit allowed nationwide scope, reflecting the internal debate.) The Ninth Circuit, faced with several nationwide injunctions against Trump policies, sometimes temporarily narrowed them to the circuit or plaintiff group (only to be later mooted by Supreme Court stays). These nuances show that lower courts lack consensus: some readily issue broad injunctions; others try to cabin them.

As of 2025, the Supreme Court seems poised to provide clarity. The Biden Administration’s tenure saw the Court employ alternative tools – notably, standing doctrine – to curtail the flood of multistate lawsuits seeking universal relief. In United States v. Texas (2023), involving states suing to enjoin DHS’s deportation priorities nationwide, the Court found Texas lacked Article III standing, thereby vacating the injunction without directly ruling on its scope. This route – tightening standing for states or others who seek broad injunctions – is a way to indirectly limit nationwide injunctions (by reducing who can even challenge federal policies in court). However, standing doctrine may not solve the core issue in cases where plaintiffs clearly have standing (e.g., an individual affected by a travel ban clearly has standing, but the question is whether relief can extend beyond that individual). Therefore, most expect the Court will eventually squarely confront the remedial question.

Justice Thomas’s clarion call in 2018 – essentially inviting a suitable case – may be answered by the ongoing litigation in 2025. The example of the birthright citizenship executive order, with multiple nationwide injunctions quickly issued and an emergency appeal by the Trump Administration, could be the catalyst for a landmark Supreme Court decision. The Court could hold, for instance, that absent class certification, district courts should not issue injunctions benefiting people who are not parties (thus limiting “universal” relief). Such a decision would return the practice more closely to historical norms, aligning with Bray’s proposal of plaintiff-protective injunctions only. Alternatively, the Court might craft a middle-ground rule: permitting nationwide relief only in special circumstances (say, when necessary to give the plaintiff complete relief or when a class action is impracticable), while generally advising narrower injunctions. In any event, it is widely acknowledged that the current free-for-all – where any one of 94 district courts can halt a federal law’s operation nationwide – is unlikely to persist without modification.

V. Universal Injunctions in the Biden and Trump Administrations: A Comparative View

The use of universal injunctions has varied under different presidencies, but it has consistently reflected the partisan dynamics described above. Under the Biden Administration (2021–2024), most nationwide injunctions were issued at the behest of Republican state attorneys-general or conservative advocacy groups targeting Biden’s policies. By one accounting, 14 nationwide injunctions were issued against Biden-era initiatives through the end of Biden’s term. These included injunctions blocking: the proposed end of the “Remain in Mexico” program (immigration); revised immigration enforcement guidelines (the Texas case noted above); a moratorium on new oil and gas leasing on federal lands (environmental policy, enjoined by a Louisiana court); the CDC’s federal eviction moratorium during COVID-19 (enjoined by a D.C. judge, later confirmed unlawful by the Supreme Court); the OSHA vaccine-or-test mandate for large employers (stayed and effectively invalidated by the Supreme Court) and the federal contractor vaccine mandate (enjoined by a Georgia judge); and an HHS transgender health protection rule (enjoined by a Texas judge). In many of these instances, the Supreme Court stepped in on its “shadow docket.” Sometimes the Court approved of the injunction by denying a stay (as in the early stage of the Texas v. Biden MPP case, forcing Biden to continue that program for a time), but more often it granted stays to allow the policy or a version of it to proceed pending appeal (as with the DHS “public charge” rule in 2020, the CDC eviction moratorium in 2021, and the mifepristone case in 2023). The Court’s conservative majority generally showed skepticism of the expansive use of injunctions against Biden’s executive actions. Notably, in the vaccine mandate cases (Jan. 2022), the Supreme Court effectively tailored the scope of relief itself: it stayed the Kentucky district court’s injunction against the CMS healthcare-worker vaccine mandate (which had applied nationwide), thereby permitting that mandate to go into effect everywhere, even as it struck down the OSHA rule nationwide. This interventionist approach – modifying or dissolving broad injunctions on an emergency basis – characterized the Court’s response in the Biden years. Yet the Court avoided any pronouncement that explicitly forbade nationwide injunctions; it continued to treat each case’s merits or standing and grant narrow relief (stays) accordingly.

Under the current Trump Administration (2025–present), the pattern has reversed: now it is Democratic-led states and organizations racing to courthouses to block President Trump’s initiatives, and many Obama- or Biden-appointed judges have been willing to issue universal injunctions. In the first few months of 2025, a flurry of such injunctions greeted President Trump’s actions. As mentioned, his executive order targeting birthright citizenship was instantly frozen by judges in multiple jurisdictions with nationwide injunctions. Likewise, new executive moves on climate policy (e.g., rescinding Biden’s climate regulations) have been enjoined by at least one district court nationally. The sheer number of universal injunctions in early 2025 – 15 in two months – alarmed even some who had tolerated the practice before. The Supreme Court’s response has been notably assertive. In the birthright citizenship EO situation, the Court accepted the administration’s emergency appeal and, observers report, seemed inclined to curb the injunctions’ scope if not stay them entirely. In another instance, when a D.C. district judge issued a temporary restraining order halting the Trump Administration’s freeze of certain foreign aid funds, the Supreme Court intervened within days. It ordered the judge to clarify the TRO due to its broad effects (which would have forced the expenditure of $2 billion in funds to entities not party to the case). This unusual step signaled the Court’s impatience with aggressive nationwide orders even at preliminary stages. Legal commentators have noted that the Supreme Court’s conservative majority, having voiced theoretical objections to universal injunctions in the past, now has tangible opportunities (and perhaps the incentive) to sharply rein them in. President Trump’s Justice Department has been actively urging the high court to do so, arguing in filings that nationwide injunctions “disrupt the constitutional balance and should be confined or abolished”.

A contrast between the Biden and Trump eras can also be seen in how lower courts and the government behave. Under Biden, DOJ often lamented the nationwide injunctions but complied while seeking expedited review (for example, Secretary Mayorkas’ DHS complied with the Texas court’s nationwide halt of the 100-day deportation pause, even as DOJ appealed). Under Trump in 2025, DOJ has taken an even more aggressive posture: swiftly appealing, sometimes even partially defying broad orders in expectation of a quick stay from higher courts (a risky tactic, but reflecting confidence that the Supreme Court is on their side). District judges, aware of the likely skepticism of the Supreme Court, have occasionally tried to narrow their orders – for instance, one judge in early 2025, when enjoining a new travel-ban-like policy, limited the injunction to the plaintiff organizations and their members (rather than making it fully universal). However, other judges have proceeded to issue full nationwide relief, asserting that only uniform application will adequately protect the plaintiffs’ rights (the judge in Massachusetts in the birthright case wrote that “partial relief would invite an unmanageable patchwork of citizenship rules”). Thus, there is variation, but the trend of universal relief continues.

Notable rulings and Supreme Court stays in each era: Under Biden, a signature moment was the Court’s decision in NFIB v. OSHA (2022) – while technically about agency authority, its practical effect was to dissolve a nationwide stay on the OSHA rule and end that policy. In Biden v. Missouri (2022), the Court allowed the CMS mandate by staying the narrower injunction; effectively, the Supreme Court was calibrating the scope of relief itself, something it may do more overtly regarding nationwide injunctions in the future. Under Trump 2025, the birthright citizenship case stands out – the Supreme Court’s pending consideration could yield a decision that either stays the injunctions (letting the policy proceed for some or all people) or leaves them in place pending full review. If the Court issues an opinion limiting nationwide injunctions in that context, it will mark a doctrinal shift. We may see the Court resurrect the notion that injunctions “should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” – a principle from Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979), that many say should forbid extending relief to nonparties unless unavoidable. A formal embrace of that principle by the Supreme Court in 2025 would effectively end routine universal injunctions.

Another difference is how the Supreme Court’s shadow docket is perceived. During 2017–2020, critics (mostly on the left) complained that the Court was too quick to stay injunctions against Trump’s policies, thereby favoring the executive. During 2021–2024, conversely, conservatives praised the Court for stopping what they saw as rogue lower courts hampering Biden (for instance, staying an injunction so the Title 42 border policy could be lifted on schedule, or preventing an overly broad order in the social-media contacts case). Now in 2025, even some who defended nationwide injunctions in the Trump (1st term) years are questioning them because they see the shoe on the other foot. This has led to a curious alignment where both political sides have, at different times, argued against nationwide injunctions (depending on who holds the presidency). Such flip-flopping underscores that the issue is institutional: it transcends specific policies and goes to the heart of how our dual court system (trial and appellate courts nationwide) should interact with a unitary federal government.

Conclusion

The saga of the universal injunction – from its modest equitable origins to its modern prominence – raises fundamental questions about judicial power in the American system. Historically, courts adhered to an in personam, party-bound model of equitable relief, a principle rooted in English common law and carried into the Article III judiciary. Over the 20th century, especially the latter half, the pressures of administering nationwide programs and safeguarding rights in an interconnected society led courts to experiment with broader remedies. The rise of the nationwide injunction reflects this evolution: by the 2010s, it had become almost routine in high-stakes litigation for a single judge to issue orders with countrywide effect.

This development has provoked a rich debate. On one side are those who view universal injunctions as a necessary tool to ensure uniform protection of rights and checks on unlawful government action, especially in an era of hyper-polarization and fast-moving executive policy. On the other side are those who argue that such injunctions exceed judicial authority, undermine the separation of powers, encourage forum shopping, and shortcut the percolation of legal issues. The Supreme Court itself has sent mixed signals – intervening often to curb broad injunctions, yet not formally banning them. Justice Thomas’s and Justice Gorsuch’s writings make clear that at least some Justices believe a correction is needed. Lower courts, too, have begun inserting caveats (limiting scope or pressing for class actions) in recognition of the controversy.

As of April 2025, the universal injunction stands at a crossroads. The current Trump Administration has brought the issue to a head, with a wave of injunctions and an Administration determined to fight them. The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions may for the first time delineate the true bounds of equitable relief under Article III in this context. It could be a moment of retrenchment – restoring the historical norm that courts “do not…provide relief to non-parties” absent extraordinary circumstances – or the Court might allow the practice with certain guiding principles (for instance, requiring a clear justification for universal scope). In parallel, Congress has shown interest in legislating on the matter, which could either preempt or respond to the Court’s rulings.

What is certain is that the concept of the nationwide injunction has indelibly impacted the balance of power among the branches. It has given individual plaintiffs and states immense leverage in battles over federal policy, but at some cost to the traditional role of courts and the orderly development of law. The coming resolution – whether by judicial decision or statute – will seek to rebalance these considerations. As one court observed, the goal should be to “give complete relief to the prevailing party without needlessly barring enforcement of a statute for others who are not before the court”. Achieving that balance is no easy task, but it is essential for preserving both the rule of law and the proper function of an independent judiciary.

In closing, the universal injunction’s journey from an equitable oddity to a commonplace remedy illustrates the dynamic nature of American jurisprudence. The debate it has sparked touches on enduring themes: the scope of judicial power, the dialogue between courts and political branches, and the means by which our legal system seeks to provide justice. The resolution of this debate – unfolding even now – will shape the remedial landscape of federal courts for years to come, determining whether the universal injunction remains a powerful, if contentious, tool or is reined back to more modest proportions consistent with historical practice and constitutional design.

Sources:

  • Blackstone, Commentaries (1768), and early American cases emphasizing in personam equity.
  • Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923) (taxpayer suit to enjoin federal statute “cannot be entertained in equity” absent direct injury).
  • Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 115 (1897) (injunction on behalf of a class of non-parties deemed “too conjectural”).
  • Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (2017) (arguing national injunction is a recent development and proposing plaintiff-only injunction rule).
  • Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the “Universal” Injunction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920 (2020) (documenting early instances of non-party injunctions and concluding they are consistent with Article III).
  • Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (questioning universal injunctions as beyond traditional equity and possibly unconstitutional).
  • Justice Neil Gorsuch, concurring in Dep’t of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U.S. ___ (2020) (criticizing nationwide injunctions for forcing rushed decisions and lacking historical basis).
  • United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (upholding nationwide injunction against DAPA).
  • Hawai‘i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming nationwide injunction against Travel Ban 2.0); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (2018) (upholding later travel ban but noting injunction issue only in Thomas concurrence).
  • City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming injunction on sanctuary cities policy; Manion, J., dissenting in part on nationwide scope).
  • Grassley, “A Bill to Stop Nationwide Injunctions” (Mar. 2025) (press release).
  • AP News, Supreme Court seems in no hurry to rule on Trump plea to rein in judge’s ability to block policy (Mar. 20, 2025).
  • University of Colorado Law Review Symposium, National Injunctions: What Does the Future Hold? (2020) (collecting views: Trammell, Rendleman in favor of broad court authority; Bray and others against).
  • Recent examples from Biden and Trump administrations demonstrating usage of nationwide injunctions and Supreme Court stays.
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